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Privacy Preserving Distributed OLAP is becoming a critical challenge for next-generation
Business Intelligence (BI) scenarios, due to the “natural suitability” of OLAP in analyzing
distributed massive BI repositories in a multidimensional and multi-granularity manner. In
particular, in these scenarios XML-formatted BI repositories play a dominant role, due to
the well-know amenities of XML in modeling and representing distributed business data.
However, while Privacy Preserving Distributed Data Mining has been widely investigated, the
problem of effectively and eﬃciently supporting privacy preserving OLAP over distributed
collections of XML documents, which is relevant in practice, has been neglected so far. In
order to fulﬁll this gap, we propose a novel Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC)-based
privacy preserving OLAP framework for distributed collections of XML documents. The framework
has many novel features ranging from nice theoretical properties to an effective and
eﬃcient protocol, called Secure Distributed OLAP aggregation protocol (SDO). The eﬃciency of
our approach has been validated by an experimental evaluation over distributed collections
of synthetic, benchmark and real-life XML documents.
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Inc.
1. Introduction
OLAP [14,17] data cubes [42] play a central role in next-generation Business Intelligence (BI) systems, mainly because of
the fact that they support both multidimensional and multi-granularity analysis of large data sets, with a performance that
cannot be achieved by traditional OLTP systems (e.g., SQL interfaces over DBMS). Nevertheless, due to the “semantically-rich”
nature of data cubes (e.g., [24,56]) and the availability of a large variety of OLAP queries and operators (e.g., [34,47,90]),
OLAP can be exploited by malicious users seeking to infer sensitive knowledge from corporate data repositories underlying
OLAP server platforms [84].
Such a problem, which signiﬁcantly impacts on the trustworthiness and reliability of OLAP server platforms, has mo-
tivated the development of recent approaches addressing the problem of devising meaningful privacy preserving OLAP
techniques (e.g., [4,22,35,46,48,73,84,85,94,23,58,5,77]). This is a fundamental problem in Privacy Preserving Data Mining [3]
research and has recently attracted the interest of a large community of Database and Data Warehousing researchers
[11,21,65].
The proposed approaches address two apparently-similar but indeed-different problems. The ﬁrst problem deals with
preserving the privacy of singleton data cubes in centralized client-server environments (e.g., [22,35,48,73,84,85,94,23,58,5]).
The second one focuses on supporting privacy preserving OLAP over multiple distributed data sources (e.g., [4,77,46]). In
other words, the ﬁrst problem can be viewed as the problem of computing a privacy preserving data cube from an (already-
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cube from distributed data sources. Such dichotomy has motivated our research.
Another important research perspective that has motivated our efforts is the fact that XML is the predominant data
deﬁnition and exchange language for data repositories in BI systems, and large amounts of business data are now repre-
sented in XML and accessed by means of XML query languages such as XQuery [88] and XPath [87]. With respect to storage
issues related to business data, we identify two meaningful alternatives. The ﬁrst alternative is a native approach in which
data cubes are represented in terms of repositories of XML documents on top of which a certain DW logical schema (e.g.,
star or snowﬂake schemas — [83]) and a built-in multidimensional access method [36] are deﬁned. The second alternative
is based on a full-materialization approach in which multidimensional data are represented in terms of XML cubes [52,62]
that directly store materialized data cells aggregated from the target collection of XML documents. Both alternatives have
merits; in particular, the native approach is more ﬂexible whereas the full-materialization approach improves OLAP query
performance.
Motivated by these considerations, in this paper we investigate the problem of effectively and eﬃciently supporting
privacy preserving OLAP over distributed XML documents. Therefore, with respect to the above classiﬁcation we consider the case
of privacy preserving OLAP in distributed environments populated by (distributed) collections of (native) XML documents.
Such case can be considered as a typical Privacy Preserving Distributed Data Mining problem [16], where the main goal is
to eﬃciently support Data Mining activities (e.g., association rule mining [81,53], clustering [82,49,50], and so forth) across
multiple distributed databases while ensuring that (i) no participant can access sensitive data stored in databases of other
participants, and (ii) no participant can infer sensitive knowledge other than the knowledge obtained by the target Data
Mining activity. However, while Privacy Preserving Distributed Data Mining has been widely investigated, and a plethora
of proposal exists (e.g., [81,53,82,49,50]), the problem of effectively and eﬃciently supporting privacy preserving OLAP over
distributed collections of XML documents, which is relevant in practice, has been neglected so far. In this research, we fulﬁll
this so-germane gap, and provide both theoretical and technical contributions to the wider scientiﬁc area recognized in
literature under the term “privacy preserving OLAP”.
A possible approach to address the problem above is based on the Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC) [91,40,66] model.
Several Privacy Preserving Distributed Data Mining protocols have been designed and engineered based on SMC. These basic
protocols can then be used as building blocks for more complex Privacy Preserving Distributed Data Mining tasks. Among such
tasks, we recall [16]: (i) the secure sum (e.g., [72]), which computes the (secure) sum of a set of sensitive values; (ii) the
secure set union (e.g., [67]), which computes the (secure) union set from distributed sets; (iii) the secure size of set intersection
(e.g., [33]), which computes the (secure) size of the intersection set from distributed sets; (iv) secure scalar product (e.g.,
[38]), which computes the (secure) scalar product between two Boolean vectors.
In the reference application scenario investigated in our research, multiple XML documents storing business data are
located in the target distributed environment, and an external application wishes to perform OLAP tasks over these XML
documents, in order to retrieve knowledge useful for OLAP analysis and prediction to all the distributed environment parties.
Such OLAP tasks require the execution of OLAP operations over the collection of XML documents stored in each node in the
distributed environment, and the computation of the global (ﬁnal) result via the composition of all the local (intermediate)
results provided by OLAP operations, under the constraints imposed by the SMC model. This means that while each node
of the distributed environment is not allowed to access the local (OLAP) result provided by other nodes, the external
application has to privately send to all the participating nodes the global (OLAP) result. Such global knowledge can be then
exploited by all the participants of the distributed environment for decision making purposes.
In order to support effective and eﬃcient privacy preserving OLAP in the above reference application scenario, we pro-
pose an innovative SMC-based privacy preserving OLAP framework over distributed XML documents. The proposed framework is
based on the following steps:
• At each node of the distributed environment, business data stored in the XML documents collection are materialized
into ad-hoc OLAP views for eﬃciency purposes. These OLAP views are deﬁned by the external application on the basis of
BI goals via meaningful MultiDimensional eXpressions (MDX) [61] queries that are parsed into appropriate sets of XQuery
statements ﬁnally extracting aggregations from the target XML document collection.
• Having ﬁxed a certain node ordering (e.g., DNS-based), the ﬁrst node N0 in the distributed environment computes a
privacy preserving version V PP0 of its proper OLAP view, denoted by V0, and sends V
PP
0 to the second node N1 in the
distributed environment that, in turn, (1) combines V PP0 with its proper local view, denoted by V1, in order to perform
the target OLAP operation and (2) sends the local OLAP result, which is again represented by a view, denoted by V PP1 ,
to the “following” node according to the ﬁxed node ordering, and so forth. It should be noted that, since V PP0 is privacy
preserving, V PP1 is also privacy preserving. This step is iterated until the local OLAP result computed at node Nn−1 in
the distributed environment, denoted by V PPn−1, is returned to the node N0, which derives from V PPn−1 the exact global
OLAP result of the target OLAP task, denoted by V GLOBAL , on the basis of the local view V0, which is hidden to the other
nodes of the distributed environment, and its privacy preserving version V PP0 .
• The ﬁnal global OLAP result V GLOBAL is sent to the external application that ﬁnally forwards V GLOBAL to all the other
nodes in the distributed environment.
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The main contributions of our proposed framework are the following: (i) the adaptation of the SMC model to the context
of OLAP over distributed XML documents, which is a relevant context in practice; (ii) the deﬁnition of a novel task for
Privacy Preserving Distributed Data Mining tailored to OLAP over distributed XML documents, called secure distributed OLAP
aggregation task; (iii) an innovative approach for computing privacy preserving versions of OLAP views; (iv) an effective
and eﬃcient protocol that implements the secure distributed OLAP aggregation task, called SDO — Secure Distributed OLAP
aggregation protocol; (v) the experimental evaluation of the protocol SDO’s performance against distributed collections of
synthetic XML documents, which proves the effectiveness and the eﬃciency of the proposed protocol.
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce principles and deﬁnitions about the
novel secure distributed OLAP aggregation task proposed in our research. Section 3 reviews related work that is relevant for
our research. In Section 4, we describe our approach for aggregating collections of XML documents into two-dimensional
OLAP views. Section 5 focuses the attention on the CUR decomposition method for computing privacy preserving two-
dimensional OLAP views, along with relevant theoretical properties and results. In Section 6, we provide models, algorithms
and theoretical results on the secure distributed OLAP aggregation protocol SDO. Section 7 provides a comprehensive exper-
imental campaign on the eﬃciency of our privacy preserving distributed OLAP framework against collections of synthetic,
benchmark and real-life XML documents. Finally, Section 8 contains conclusions of our research and directions for further
investigation in the context of privacy preserving OLAP over distributed environments.
2. Secure distributed OLAP aggregation: a novel challenge for privacy preserving OLAP
Fig. 1 shows a reference application scenario example which captures the typical setting of OLAP over distributed XML
documents. In the scenario shown in Fig. 1, an external application wishes to perform OLAP tasks over the following dis-
tributed DW-enabled collections of XML documents that store sale data: Electric Parts, Computer Parts, Mechanical Parts, Car
Parts.
With respect to the general guidelines given in Section 1, two relevant aspects characterize our proposed reference
application scenario.
First, at each node in the distributed environment, business data stored in the collection of XML documents are mate-
rialized into a two-dimensional OLAP view. While this can initially appear as a limitation, two-dimensional OLAP views have
already demonstrated, beyond their intrinsic simplicity, good capabilities in capturing signiﬁcant instances of OLAP applica-
tions (e.g., see [24]). On the other hand, two-dimensional OLAP views have lower computational overheads with respect to
the materialization, access, processing and probing phases than multidimensional OLAP views. It should be noted that this
characteristic of two-dimensional OLAP views plays a more critical role in distributed environments than in centralized ones,
as processing multidimensional data in distributed environments is naturally more resource-consuming than in centralized
environments (e.g., [19,25]).
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Fig. 2 shows a typical two-dimensional OLAP view that one could ﬁnd in an instance of our reference application
scenario. Here, the OLAP view example has two dimensions, namely Time (with granularity Month) and Customer (with
granularity Class), and the measure is Sale (in KEUR). Each OLAP view cell V [m][c] stores the total amount of sales in KEUR
due to a customer belonging to class c during month m. It should be noted that this simple yet effective view allows us
to perform useful OLAP-based knowledge extraction from the underlying collection of XML documents alimenting the view,
such as discovering the total amounts of sales due to two or more correlated customer classes (e.g., Tmp Worker and Perm
Worker, or Division Chief and Manager) in a given interval of time (e.g., [Feb 08 :May 08]).
Second, although our privacy preserving distributed OLAP framework is general enough to be customized with respect
to any arbitrary (distributed) OLAP task, in our research we consider the special case represented by distributed OLAP
aggregation tasks. These tasks, which are novel OLAP tasks for distributed BI environments, are introduced in this paper
as a meaningful extension of conventional OLAP aggregation tasks in centralized environments (e.g., [22,35,48,73,84,85,94,
23,58,5]), and have been inspired by pioneering research efforts in the context of privacy preserving distributed OLAP (e.g.,
[4,77,46]). Without going into details, it is easy to understand that distributed OLAP aggregation tasks are fundamental for
next-generation distributed BI environments.
Formally, given a set of distributed BI repositories R modeled in terms of OLAP views, a distributed OLAP aggregation
task T over R aims at computing the OLAP view V GLOBAL that stores the ﬁnal aggregations computed on top of all the OLAP
views of R . T can either be simple [42] or complex (e.g., [45]) in nature.
It should be noted that distributed OLAP aggregation tasks can run according to two different modes, namely the Homo-
geneous Logical Schemas (HoLS) mode and the Heterogeneous Logical Schemas (HeLS) mode. According to the HoLS mode, all
the input OLAP views are characterized by an identical (OLAP) logical schema, i.e. identical set of dimensions and measures,
whereas in the HeLS mode all or a partition of the input OLAP views are characterized by different (OLAP) logical schemas.
In the latter case, OLAP data integration approaches (e.g., [78]) can be adopted in order to solve the heterogeneities arising
among the views’ logical-schemas. For sake of simplicity, in our research we focus the attention on the HoLS mode, i.e.
namely distributed OLAP aggregation tasks running over a set of OLAP views characterized by an identical logical schema.
However, our proposed privacy preserving distributed OLAP framework can easily incorporate within its core layer any (or-
thogonal) OLAP data integration technique and is thus able of dealing with OLAP views characterized by heterogeneous
logical schemas.
Consider Fig. 1, where the reference application scenario of our research is shown. Here, the HoLS mode is explicitly
obtained during the set-up phase of the secure distributed OLAP aggregation task. In this phase, the external application
issues an ad-hoc MDX query Q i to each node Ni of the distributed environment in order to obtain, at all the nodes,
OLAP views characterized by an identical logical schema. This implies that: (i) the sets of dimensions and measures of DW
schemas of collections of XML documents stored in nodes of the distributed environment are not disjointed; (ii) the external
application is aware of the DW schema of collections of XML documents stored in each node; (iii) the MDX queries are
meaningfully parsed into appropriate sets of XQuery statements able to generate the desired OLAP view in each node of the
distributed environment.
Fig. 3 shows a distributed OLAP aggregation task example, which is based on the SQL aggregate operator SUM. Here, two
two-dimensional OLAP views Vi and V j having identical logical schema are aggregated into the two-dimensional OLAP view
V GLOBAL . Views Vi and V j are located at two different nodes of the target distributed environment, namely Ni an N j , respec-
tively, and the view V GLOBAL modeling the result of the distributed OLAP aggregation task is located at another node Ng .
Let dk,0 and dk,1 denote the ﬁrst and the second (OLAP) dimension of the OLAP view Vk , respectively, with k in {i, j}.
It is easy to see that each data cell V GLOBAL[mg][cg] of V GLOBAL is obtained as the aggregation of the corresponding data
cells in views Vi and V j , respectively, i.e. V GLOBAL[mg][cg] = Vi[mi][ci] + V j[mj][c j] ∀mi,mj ∈ {0,1, . . . ,‖di,0‖ ≡ ‖d j,0‖} and
ci, c j ∈ {0,1, . . . ,‖di,1‖ ≡ ‖d j,1‖}, where ‖dk,l‖ denotes the cardinality of the dimension dk,l , with k in {i, j} and l in {0,1}.
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As the previous example suggests, distributed OLAP aggregation tasks are novel important tools for next-generation
distributed BI environments. In our research, we speciﬁcally focus the attention on the class of SUM-based distributed OLAP
aggregation tasks, being SUM a popular aggregate operator for OLAP applications (e.g., [19]). Despite this, our proposed
framework is general enough to deal with more sophisticated distributed OLAP aggregation tasks that embed complex OLAP
aggregations (e.g., [45]) rather than conventional ones (e.g., SUM, COUNT, AVG — [42]). It should be noted how the latter
distributed OLAP model is perfectly compliant with recent research initiatives developed in the context of advanced analytics
over complex data (e.g., [10,13]).
We now focus on the proper privacy preserving aspects of the proposed distributed OLAP aggregation tasks. Consider
again the running example of Fig. 3. Here, in order to compute the global OLAP view V GLOBAL , at node N j the local OLAP
view V j must be aggregated with the local OLAP view Vi from node Ni . Therefore, Vi is disclosed to N j , which, because of
this privacy breach, can access sensitive knowledge kept at Ni . Our privacy preserving distributed OLAP framework aims at
preventing privacy breaches that can arise while executing distributed OLAP aggregation tasks. As highlighted in Section 1,
the main idea of the proposed approach consists in computing appropriate privacy preserving versions of local OLAP views
so that the current node Ni receiving view Vi−1 from node Ni−1 is not allowed to access sensitive knowledge kept in Ni−1.
3. Related work
As highlighted in Section 1, while Privacy Preserving Distributed Data Mining has been widely investigated, and a
plethora of proposal exists (e.g., [81,53,82,49,50]), the problem of effectively and eﬃciently supporting privacy preserv-
ing OLAP over distributed collections of XML documents, which is relevant in practice, has been neglected so far. Hence, our
proposed research can reasonable be considered as innovative. However, despite this gap in active literature, three scientiﬁc
areas still determine the background knowledge for our research: (i) privacy preservation of distributed XML documents; (ii) pri-
vacy preservation of OLAP data cubes; (iii) distributed privacy preserving OLAP. In the following, we review signiﬁcant research
efforts done in these scientiﬁc areas.
3.1. Privacy preservation techniques over distributed XML documents
While there is a large corpus of research efforts focusing the attention on the issue of providing effective and eﬃcient
secure access control over XML documents, both on centralized (e.g., [27]) and distributed (e.g., [8]) environments, the problem
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meaning is still open and demanding for further investigation, despite its relevance for modern information system applica-
tions (e.g., [6]). On the other hand, the related problem of distributing XML documents in a secure manner has instead received
more attention from the research community (e.g., [9,55]). Among the sporadic initiatives adhering to the specialized con-
text of privacy preservation techniques over distributed XML documents, which is of interest for our research, [12] proposes
a lightweight framework for privacy preserving peer-to-peer (P2P) XML databases in very large publish-subscribe systems, called
XPPX, which particularly focuses on the P2P setting. XPPX allows us to simultaneously achieve (i) privacy-preserving
fragmentation of XML documents stored in P2P XML databases, and (ii) the creation of trusted groups of peers by means
of “self-certifying” XPath [87] links. These amenities are obtained by means of innovative lightweight XPath-based identiﬁers
that exploit the beneﬁts of well-known ﬁngerprinting techniques [68]. XFlat [37] is another method that proposes privacy-
preserving query-friendly publishing of XML document views in distributed environments, at a provable (query) eﬃciency. The
idea here consists in decomposing XML trees into a set of sub-trees with the same accessibility on each node to all users,
and then encrypting and storing each sub-tree in a ﬂat-sequential way.
3.2. Privacy preservation techniques over OLAP data cubes
Privacy preservation techniques over OLAP data cubes solve the problem of making privacy preserving a given singleton
data cube. The main motivation of this research area argues that today’s OLAP server platforms lack of effective countermea-
sures to face-off relevant-in-practice limitations deriving from privacy breaches. For what regards previous research efforts,
apart from some preliminary, sporadic studies in the context of securing data warehouses [11] and data cubes [65], there
exist few works in literature (see [21] for a survey), so that, actually, privacy preserving OLAP can be reasonably considered
as a quite-neglected research line, despite its clear relevance.
Contrary to this actual trend, privacy preserving issues in statistical databases, which represent the theoretical foundations
of privacy preserving OLAP, have been deeply investigated during past years [1], and a relevant number of techniques devel-
oped in this context are still waiting to be studied, extended and integrated within the core layer of OLAP server platforms.
Basically, privacy preserving techniques for statistical databases can be classiﬁed in two main classes: restriction-based tech-
niques, and perturbation-based techniques. A similar classiﬁcation can be provided for more recent privacy preserving OLAP
techniques, which are inspired to the former techniques. Recent studies have further conﬁrmed the convergence between
privacy preserving issues of statistical databases and OLAP, by studying the privacy preservation of OLAP-like queries over
such databases (e.g., [89]).
Restriction-based techniques propose restricting the number of classes of queries that can be posed to the target database
(e.g., [29,15]); perturbation-based techniques propose adding random noise at various levels of the target database, ranging
from schemas [70] to query answers [7]. As an extension of these basic techniques, auditing query techniques aim at devising
intelligent methodologies for detecting which queries must be forbidden, in order to preserve privacy. Therefore, these
approaches have particularly been studied in the broader context of restriction-based privacy preserving techniques. Auditing
techniques aim at analyzing the past (answered) queries in order to determine whether actual answers can be composed
by malicious users to infer sensitive knowledge in the form of answers to forbidden (i.e., unauthorized) queries. To this end,
a restriction-based technique needs to audit queries posed to the target data server during an adequately-wide interval of
time. Auditing queries in statistical databases is the conceptual and theoretical basis of auditing queries in OLAP systems.
Interesting auditing techniques for queries against statistical databases have been proposed in [29], which introduces a
model for auditing average and median queries, and [15], which proposes a technique for handling the past history of
SUM queries in order to reduce the sequence of answered queries, to privacy preservation purposes. More recently, few
approaches focusing on the problem of auditing techniques for OLAP data cubes and queries appeared. Among all, we
recall: (i) [94] that proposes an interesting information theoretic approach that simply counts the number of cells already
covered to answer previous queries in order to establish if a new query should be answered or not; (ii) [60] that introduces
a novel notation for auditing range-SUM queries against statistical databases making use of Integer Linear Programming (ILP)
tools for detecting if a new range-SUM query can be answered safely or not.
Nevertheless, due to different, speciﬁc motivations, both restriction-based and perturbation-based techniques are not
effective and eﬃcient in OLAP, while auditing techniques for OLAP still need to demonstrate their validity. Restriction-based
techniques are quite ineffective in OLAP since the nature of OLAP analysis is intrinsically interactive, and based on a wide set
of operators and query classes. Perturbation-based techniques, which process one data cube cell at time, are quite ineﬃcient
in OLAP since they introduce excessive computational overheads when executed on massive data cubes (e.g., [22,23]).
Another class of proposals for privacy preserving OLAP research consists in adapting to data cubes consolidated access
control schemes inherited from traditional DBMS technology. These schemes establish how client applications must access
multidimensional data on the basis of grants and revokes [43], roles [69], and authorization rules [51], thus limiting accesses
to sensitive data. Access control techniques are not suitable for OLAP, since, while DBMS access control solutions are im-
plemented on top of relational schemas, so that they eﬃciently exploit the ﬂexibility offered by such schemas, data cubes
are characterized by multidimensional schemas [83] that, contrary to relational ones, do not ensure a high degree of ﬂexi-
bility. In consequence of this, some initiatives focus the attention on the hierarchical nature of OLAP dimensions in order to
develop multidimensional access control schemes for data cubes (e.g., [65]). Data sanitization is a further alternative proposal
that asserts removing explicit identiﬁers from relational tuples in order to obtain anonymous tuples, and, in turn, anonymous
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are ineffective on online-published data sources [74,59,57]. In line with this direction, [93] is a work related to our research,
as it properly focuses the attention on the problem of supporting OLAP-like queries over anonymized database tables.
More recently, [85] proposes a cardinality-based inference control scheme that aims at ﬁnding suﬃcient conditions
for obtaining safe data cubes, i.e. data cubes such that the number of known values is under a tight bound. In line with
this research, [84] proposes a privacy preserving OLAP approach that combines access and inference control techniques
[28], being (i) ﬁrst one based on the hierarchical nature of data cubes modeled in terms of cuboid lattices [42] and multi-
resolution of data, and (ii) second one based on directly applying restriction to coarser aggregations of data cubes, and then
removing remaining inferences that can be still derived. [85] and [84] are not properly comparable with our work, as they
basically combine a technique inspired from statistical databases with an access control scheme, which are both outside
the scope of this paper. [48] extends results of [84] via proposing algorithm FMC, which still works on the cuboid lattice
to hide sensitive data that cause inference, and argues that hiding these sensitive partitions of data is enough in order to
achieve the notion of secure data cubes. [73] proposes a random data distortion technique, called Zero-Sum, for preserving the
privacy of data cells while providing accurate answers to range queries. To this end, [73] iteratively alters the values of
data cells of the target data cube in such a way as to maintain the marginal sums of data cells along rows and columns
of the data cube equal to zero. This ensures the privacy of individual data cells, and the correctness of answers to range
queries. When applied to massive data cubes, [73] clearly introduces excessive overheads, which are not comparable with
low computational requirements by typical OLAP processing tasks (e.g., [19]). [58] describes yet another perturbation-based
technique for OLAP data cubes, called Cubic-Wise Balance method, whose main goal is that of providing privacy preserving
range queries over data cubes. This is achieved via retrieving an appropriate closely-estimated summary data for range queries
without providing access to actual individual data values, like in other similar perturbation-based approaches.
Furthermore, in [22] a robust sampling-based framework for privacy preserving OLAP is introduced. The most distinctive
characteristic of this framework consists in adopting an innovative privacy OLAP notion, which deals with the problem of
preserving the privacy of OLAP aggregations rather than the one of data cube cells, like in conventional perturbation-based
privacy preserving OLAP techniques. This results in a greater theoretical soundness, and lower computational overheads due
to processing massive-in-size data cubes. By further extending results of [22], [23] proposes a collection of ﬂexible sampling-
based data cube compression techniques for computing privacy preserving OLAP aggregations on data cubes while allowing
approximate answers to be eﬃciently evaluated over such aggregations. Here, compression is used as a tool for speeding-up
the evaluation of OLAP queries over massive-in-size data cubes, like in [25]. This novel framework addresses an application
scenario where a producer Data Warehouse server provides to consumer OLAP client applications query services over a target
data cube subjected to a reference query-workload of interest, which is cooperatively determined by the Data Warehouse
server and OLAP client applications. Some ranges of the target data cube are hidden to OLAP client applications, while
some others are disclosed to them. As a result, both accuracy and privacy features occur in the described application scenario,
which is accomplished by means of the so-called accuracy/privacy contract that determines the accuracy/privacy constraint
under which OLAP client applications must access and process multidimensional data stored in the Data Warehouse server.
[5] adds a novel constraining feature to the privacy preserving OLAP model introduced by the previous research [23] via
considering even consistency of the target data source to be made privacy preserving, beyond to their accuracy and privacy
(like in [23]). Particularly, [5] focuses the attention on the issue of effectively and eﬃciently supporting contingency table release
in the context of statistical data, like census data, while preserving privacy, accuracy and consistency (of data) simultaneously.
Contingency tables can be reasonable considered as ﬁrst-degree cousins of OLAP data cubes. The solution proposed by [5]
consists in a sort of approach producing synthetic data derived in terms of an appropriate set of marginals from the original
raw data, and stored in intermediate tables. Then, from these tables, the “nearest” consistent set of marginals are retrieved,
which ﬁnally represent the privacy preserving released contingency tables. Finally, [35] focuses the attention on the problem
of summarizing multidimensional data, like those stored in an OLAP data cube, into lossy synopses supporting the estimation
of aggregate range queries by also taking into account privacy issues, similarly to the scenario drawn by [23]. This conveys
in the problem of constructing so-called privacy-preserving synopses, which in [35] is solved by means of a probabilistic
framework that makes use of histogram-based approaches (e.g., [25]).
3.3. Distributed privacy preserving OLAP
Distributed privacy preservation techniques over OLAP data cubes solve the problem of making privacy preserving dis-
tributed OLAP data cubes or, under an alternative interpretation, making privacy preserving an OLAP data cube model over
distributed data sources. Deriving problems are similar but different in nature. As regards the ﬁrst problem, to the best of
our knowledge, in literature there not exist any proposal that deals with it, whereas, concerning the second problem, [4] is
the state-of-the-art result existent in literature. Our approach belongs to the second distributed privacy preserving OLAP
scientiﬁc context, as it aims at solving the problem of supporting privacy preserving OLAP over distributed collections of
XML documents (which is completely novel in literature), but, under a broader meaning, it also encompasses some charac-
teristics of the ﬁrst distributed privacy preserving OLAP scientiﬁc context. This because our approach consists in computing,
at each node of the reference distributed environment, a suitable two-dimensional OLAP view from the target collection of
XML documents directly (see Section 2), hence our main privacy preserving distributed task works on (distributed) two-
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nature of the privacy preserving framework we propose further conﬁrms the validity of our research.
By looking at the active literature, while a plethora of initiatives focusing on Privacy Preserving Distributed Data Mining
[16] exists, being [81,53,82,49,50] some noticeable ones, to the best of our knowledge, only [4,77,46] deal with the yet-
relevant problem of effectively and eﬃciently supporting privacy preserving OLAP over distributed data sources, speciﬁcally
falling in the second scientiﬁc context according to the taxonomy provided above. [4] deﬁnes a privacy preserving OLAP
model over data partitioned across multiple clients using a randomization approach, which is implemented by the so-called
Retention Replacement Perturbation algorithm, on the basis of which (i) clients perturb tuples with which they participate to
the partition in order to gain row-level privacy, and (ii) server is capable of evaluating OLAP queries against perturbed tables
via reconstructing original distributions of attributes involved by such queries. In [4], authors demonstrate that the proposed
distributed privacy preserving OLAP model is safe against privacy breaches. [77] is another distributed privacy preserving
OLAP approach that is reminiscent of ours. More speciﬁcally, [77] pursues the idea of obtaining a privacy preserving OLAP
data cube model from distributed data sources across multiple sites via applying perturbation-based techniques on aggregate
data that are retrieved from each singleton site as a baseline step of the main (distributed) OLAP computation task. Finally,
[46] focuses the attention on the signiﬁcant issue of providing eﬃcient data aggregation while preserving privacy over
wireless sensor networks. The proposed solution is represented by two privacy-preserving data aggregation schemes that
make use of innovative additive aggregation functions, being these schemes named as Cluster-based Private Data Aggregation
(CPDA) and Slice-Mix-AggRegaTe (SMART), respectively. Proposed aggregation functions fully-exploit topology and dynamics
of the underlying wireless sensor network, and bridge the gap between collaborative data collection over such networks
and data privacy needs.
4. Aggregating collections of XML documents into two-dimensional OLAP views
In our proposed privacy preserving distributed OLAP framework, collections of XML documents stored in nodes of the
target distributed environment are materialized into two-dimensional OLAP views, for query eﬃciency purposes. Several
recent approaches have addressed the challenging issue of rigorously deﬁning and eﬃciently implementing GROUP-BY [10,
39,63] and CUBE [86] operators within XML query languages, that are not supported by the original XQuery language. In
particular, Wiwatwattana et al. [86] propose the model Xˆ3, which makes a major step towards the deﬁnition of a re-
liable CUBE operator over XML data. However, despite such initial result, as even recognized in [86], aggregating OLAP
data cells from native XML documents is still a challenging issue. Therefore we adopt the approach of (pre-)materializing
two-dimensional OLAP views from collections of XML documents directly (i.e., in an on-the-ﬂy manner), in order to avoid
resource-consuming aggregate query evaluation over native XML documents during the execution of the secure distributed
OLAP aggregation task. It should be noted that the latter situation would result in a critical bottleneck for our privacy
preserving distributed OLAP framework, and would dramatically degrade the performance. Apart from performance, dealing
with (pre-materialized) two-dimensional OLAP views rather than with native XML documents directly well-complies with
the privacy preserving distributed OLAP approach we propose, being our method for computing privacy preserving versions
of local OLAP views (see Section 1) inherited from privacy preserving theoretical tools for large matrices (see Section 4).
As also suggested by the distributed OLAP aggregation task example depicted in Fig. 3, matrices are completely suitable
to represent two-dimensional OLAP views that are of interest to our research, hence the privacy preserving method used
in our framework is perfectly suitable to fulﬁll the requirements dictated by the privacy preserving distributed OLAP sce-
nario investigated in our research (see Section 2). In addition to this, in our reference application scenario, target external
applications and participants are both interested in the ﬁnal global OLAP (aggregate) result, rather than in lower-degree
aggregations over sub-trees of XML documents collections. The use of two-dimensional OLAP views perfectly ﬁts this goal,
as thanks to such views we are able of “globally” capturing the OLAP-like knowledge kept in the whole XML documents,
while discarding aggregations over sub-ranges of the reference data domain deﬁned by the documents themselves.
Despite some drawbacks (such as update management) that merit further research, the (pre-)materialization approach
effectively and eﬃciently supports privacy preserving distributed OLAP over XML documents, and it is also in line with
some recent research initiatives like [54] that makes use of an RDBMS in order to achieve the same goal.
For sake of simplicity, we consider a case study focusing on an XML collection consisting of a singleton XML document
only, as the more signiﬁcant case represented by a collection of multiple XML documents can be straightforwardly derived
from the actual case. Fig. 4 shows a DW-enabled XML document DW-XML that stores business data on sales performed in
stores located in some geographical areas, which are hierarchically organized into the (OLAP) hierarchy Country → State →
Store, during a certain interval of time. In particular, Fig. 4 shows an excerpt of the XML document on sales at the stores
Wal-Mart and Carrefour located in the USA states Indiana and Kentucky, respectively, during [Mar 08:Apr 08].
Fig. 5 shows instead the two-dimensional OLAP view V whose data cells are generated via a simultaneous aggregation of
elements stored in the XML document of Fig. 4, given a certain OLAP logical schema. In particular, the view V in the running
example is characterized by the dimensions Time (with granularity Month) and Zone (with granularity State), respectively,
and the measure Sale (in EUR). In particular, as shown in Fig. 5, elements of the XML document excerpt of Fig. 4 are
aggregated in the data cells V [Mar 08][Indiana], with value 50, and V [Apr 08][Kentucky], with value 35, respectively.
The cubing algorithm [20] exploited to (pre-)materialize two-dimensional OLAP views from collections of XML documents
is completely orthogonal to our proposed privacy preserving distributed OLAP framework. This further extends the capabil-
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Fig. 5. A two-dimensional OLAP view extracted from the XML document excerpt of Fig. 4.
ities of our proposed framework, which is thus suitable to be integrated with any arbitrary cubing algorithm for XML data,
due to the fact that the proper secure distributed OLAP aggregation protocol SDO is abstracted on OLAP views extracted by
means of the algorithm itself.
A reliable solution consists of making use of Xˆ3 [86], which can be reasonably considered as the state-of-the-art cubing
algorithm. The Xˆ3-extended XQuery statement which allows us to extract the two-dimensional OLAP view V of Fig. 5 from
the XML document excerpt of Fig. 4 is shown in Fig. 6.
5. CUR-based privacy preserving two-dimensional OLAP views
Given the local OLAP view V0 at the ﬁrst node N0 of the target distributed environment, a critical phase of our proposed
secure distributed OLAP aggregation protocol SDO is the computation of the privacy preserving version of V0, V PP0 , which is
then aggregated with the local view V1 of the node N1 that “follows” N0 in the ﬁxed node ordering. It is easy to understand
how this ﬁrst-step operation heavily impacts the overall degree of privacy preservation of the distributed OLAP aggregation
protocol.
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Therefore, here the critical issue is how to effectively and eﬃciently compute a privacy preserving two-dimensional
OLAP view from a given two-dimensional OLAP view. This problem has received great attention with equal emphasis
on both ROLAP (e.g., [35,48,84,85,94]) and MOLAP (e.g., [22,73,23,58,5]) cubes. Despite this proliferation, state-of-the-art
proposals cannot be directly integrated in our privacy preserving distributed OLAP framework, as they are inherently
resource-consuming, hence unsuitable for a distributed computation task.
Based on this motivation, we propose exploiting the CUR matrix decomposition [30] to compute privacy preserving
two-dimensional OLAP views. As argued by Drineas et al. [31], the CUR matrix decomposition can be used for privacy
preservation purposes.
In more detail, CUR is a matrix decomposition method for computing approximate representations of large matrices. It can
be applied to several application contexts ranging from classiﬁcation problems to similarity search problems, from analysis
of biological data to compression of hyper-spectral data for image processing, and so forth [30].
Formally, given a large m×n matrix A, a CUR matrix decomposition is a low-rank approximation of A, denoted by A′ , that
represents A in terms of a small number of columns and rows of A, as follows:⎡
⎣ A
⎤
⎦≈
⎡
⎣ C
⎤
⎦ · [ U ] · [ R ]≡
⎡
⎣ A′
⎤
⎦ (1)
where: (i) C is an m× c matrix that stores O (1) columns of A; (ii) R is an r ×n matrix that stores O (1) rows of A; (iii) U is
a c × r carefully-chosen matrix. In particular, the number of columns of C consists of c = θ(1/ε2) columns of A, and the
number of rows of R consists of r = θ(1/ε2) rows of A, respectively, with ε > 0 arbitrarily small. C and R are built by means
of adaptive sampling [76], via c (r, respectively) trials by picking a column (a row, respectively) of A with probability p j
deﬁned as follows:
p j = |A[•][ j]|
2∑
j |A[•][ j]|2
(2)
whereas the probability pi for rows is deﬁned as follows:
pi = |A[i]|
2∑
i |A[i]|2
(3)
respectively.
Given a matrix A, computing a CUR decomposition of A is a diﬃcult problem [30]. With respect to complexity, the
upper bound of the complexity of computing a CUR decomposition of an m × n matrix A is represented by the complexity
of computing the Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) [41] of A, which is O (min{m · n2,m2 · n}) in time [30]. This cost can
be prohibitive for large matrices one can ﬁnd in real-world applications. Therefore, several approaches for effectively and
eﬃciently computing CUR decompositions of large matrices have been proposed.
Given an m × n matrix A, Drineas at al. [30] address the problem of computing an effective and eﬃcient CUR decompo-
sition of A such that the deriving approximate representation of A, A′ , satisﬁes the following constraints: (i) A′ is a “good”
approximation of A; (ii) A′ can be computed after very few scans of A; (iii) A′ can be stored in O (m+n) space. [30] provides
a very nice theoretical result consisting of an algorithm that allows us to compute A′ with rank k after two scans of A in
O (c2 ·m + c3 + r3) time, by picking r = O (k/ε2) rows of A and c = O (k/ε2) columns of A, for any ε > 0 arbitrarily small,
such that the following inequality holds (error bound):∥∥A− A′∥∥2F  ‖A− Ak‖2F + ε · ‖A‖2F (4)
where: (i) ‖A‖2 denotes the spectral norm [41] of A, which is deﬁned as follows:
‖A‖2 =
√
maxλp {ΛAH·A} (5)
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the Frobenius norm [41] of A, which is deﬁned as follows:
‖A‖F =
√√√√√m−1∑
i=0
n−1∑
j=0
∣∣A[i][ j]∣∣2 (6)
(iii) Ak denotes the rank-k approximation of A given by the SVD [30], such that k ∈ {1, . . . , rank(A)}. For k = k∗ “best” rank-k
approximation of A given by the SVD (low-rank approximation), i.e. by picking r = O (1/ε2) rows of A and c = O (1/ε2)
columns of A, (4) can be re-formulated as follows [30]:∥∥A− A′∥∥22  ε · ‖A‖2F (7)
The satisfaction of inequality (7) ensures that A′ provides a “good” approximation of A, while being still different from A.
At the same, A′ can be computed in O (m) time, in terms of an asymptotic approximation of O (c2 ·m + c3 + r3). According
to Drineas et al. [31], we clearly state that both properties are suitable to Privacy Preserving Data Mining, and, in particular,
to our main goal of computing a privacy preserving two-dimensional OLAP view. Such view can be reasonably represented
by the output m×n matrix A′ provided by the CUR decomposition, from a given two-dimensional OLAP view, which can be
reasonably represented by the input m × n matrix A in the CUR decomposition process.
5.1. Theoretical analysis and results on the privacy preservation capabilities of the CUR decomposition method
Inequality (7) also embeds a probabilistic interpretation, which can be derived from results in [30]. For each pair of ε > 0
and δ > 0 arbitrarily small, with high probability the following inequality holds [64]:
P
(∥∥A− A′∥∥22  ε · ‖A‖2F ) 1− δ (8)
More precisely, (8) gives us a probabilistic (lower) bound on the probability of event eD = A 
= A′ , which models the case
of obtaining the approximate matrix A′ as different from the input matrix A. We denote as P(eD) the probability associated
with this event. In our privacy preserving distributed OLAP framework, we are indeed interested in formally estimating the
probability of the complementary (probabilistic) event of eD , namely eE = A ≡ A′ , which models the case of obtaining the
approximate matrix A′ as equal to the input matrix A. We denote as P(eE) the probability associated with this event. P(eE)
formally models the privacy risk of our framework, that is the probability of the occurrence of privacy breaches, which, in
our reference framework, are represented by the event such that A′ , or cell partitions of A′ , is equal to A, or cell partitions
of A. Furthermore, this model allows us to study how much our proposed framework is secure against these possible privacy
breaches, again in a probabilistic manner. By recalling that P(eE) = 1 − P(eD), the following probabilistic (upper) bound on
the probability of event eE = A ≡ A′ can be derived, as stated by Theorem 1:
P
(‖A‖22 = ∥∥A′∥∥22) 1− δε · ‖A‖2F (9)
Theorem 1. Given an m × n matrix A, such that m > 0 and n > 0, and its CUR-based approximating matrix A′ , for each pair 〈ε, δ〉,
such that ε > 0 and δ > 0 arbitrarily small, the probability of the event eE = A ≡ A′ is superiorly bounded by the quantity 1−δ
ε·‖A‖2F
, i.e.
P(‖A‖22 = ‖A′‖22) 1−δε·‖A‖2F .
Proof. (8) can be re-written as follows:
−1+ P(∥∥A− A′∥∥22  ε · ‖A‖2F )−δ (10)
By simple sign inversion, (10) can be re-written as follows:
1− P(∥∥A− A′∥∥22  ε · ‖A‖2F ) δ (11)
i.e.:
−P(∥∥A− A′∥∥22  ε · ‖A‖2F ) δ − 1 (12)
By noticing that, for this theoretical probabilistic setting, P(eD) is deﬁned as follows:
P
(
eD
)= P(∥∥A− A′∥∥22  ε · ‖A‖2F ) (13)
and P(eE) is deﬁned as follows:
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(
eE
)= 1− P(eD)= P(‖A‖22 = ∥∥A′∥∥22) (14)
respectively, thanks to the central limit theorem and the complementary-event’s probability theorem [64], (12) can be re-
formulated as follows:
P
(‖A‖22 = ∥∥A′∥∥22) 1− δε · ‖A‖2F (15)
which is equal to (9). 
Theorem 1 is a relevant theoretical result of our research. It further conﬁrms us the suitability of the CUR decom-
position method [30] in supporting Privacy Preserving Data Mining, as argued in [31], since the probability of obtaining
two equal matrices is negligible in practice. Thanks to Theorem 1, in our research we achieve an effective, eﬃcient and,
above all, theoretically-sound approach for computing a privacy preserving two-dimensional OLAP view from the input two-
dimensional OLAP view, which is a fundamental and critical step of the secure distributed OLAP aggregation task.
5.2. Theoretical analysis and results on the re-construction capabilities of the CUR decomposition method
Another critical property that is central to theoretical aspects of the CUR decomposition method consists in assessing the
capabilities of the method in re-constructing the original matrix A from the approximating matrix A′ that is retrieved by
the method itself. In fact, beyond playing a central role in the effectiveness of the proposed privacy preserving distributed
OLAP framework, the re-construction property also ensures the theoretical convergence of conceptual constructs and theory
tools of the framework.
In order to prove the re-construction property ensured by the CUR decomposition method, we provide Theorem 2 (see
next) whose proof is characterized by a structure inspired to a theoretical model proposed in [4], which, as highlighted in
Section 3.3, is the state-of-the-art result in the context of perturbation-based distributed privacy preservation techniques
over OLAP data cubes. In more detail, as regards the re-construction property ensured by the proposed Retention Replace-
ment Perturbation algorithm, in [4] authors provide rigorous probabilistic bounds over aggregates that are re-constructed
from a relational table that has been perturbed by means of their algorithm. These aggregates are deﬁned in terms of input
range queries over the perturbed relational table, and their values are compared with the values of aggregates retrieved
by the same queries over the original relational table. Here, we follow a similar structure, i.e. we study the re-construction
property of the CUR decomposition method via considering the aggregate values of range queries over the approximating
matrix A′ in comparison with the aggregate values of the same queries over the original matrix A.
Before to provide Theorem 2, some deﬁnitions are necessary. First, we deﬁne a two-dimensional range query Q over the
m × n matrix A (A′ , respectively) as follows:
Q = [〈l1:u1〉; 〈l2:u2〉] (16)
such that: (i) l1 denotes a lower bound on the dimension d1 of A (A′ , respectively); (ii) u1 denotes an upper bound on the
dimension d1 of A (A′ , respectively); (iii) l1 < u1; (iv) l2 denotes a lower bound on the dimension d2 of A (A′ , respectively);
(v) u2 denotes an upper bound on the dimension d2 of A (A′ , respectively); (vi) l2 < u2. On the basis of well-understood
matrix algebra [41] principles, the evaluation of Q over A (A′ , respectively) can be expressed as follows:
xT · A · y= z (17)
such that: (i) x models an m-dimensional vector whose elements x[i], with 0  i m − 1, are deﬁned as follows:
x[i] =
{
1 if l1  i  u1
0 otherwise
(18)
(ii) y models an n-dimensional vector whose elements y[ j], with 0  j  n − 1, are deﬁned as follows:
y[ j] =
{
1 if l2  j  u2
0 otherwise
(19)
and (iii) z models the answer to Q (z′ models the approximate answer to Q , respectively).
For the sake of clarity, Theorem 2 proves that the approximate answer to Q , z′ , is probabilistically-close to the exact
answer to Q , z, or, in other words, the re-construction property of the CUR decomposition method.
Second, we introduce the concept of re-constructible function, still inspired by 4, whose formal deﬁnition is provided in
Deﬁnition 1. Intuitively enough, a numeric function γ is said to be re-constructible iff it allows us to “invert” the transfor-
mation of the original matrix A, or cell partitions of A, in the perturbed matrix A′ (due to the CUR decomposition method,
in our case), or cell partitions of A′ . In our theoretical analysis, we interpret numeric functions γ as the data distributions
associated to elements of the original matrix A (the approximating matrix A′ , respectively). A relevant property of a re-
constructible function γ is that of verifying whether it is 〈n, ε, δ〉-re-constructible by means of the so-called re-constructing
function γ ′ , such that n is the number of items in γ , and ε and δ are positive integers arbitrarily small. In other words,
this corresponds to verifying whether an unbiased estimator [64] γ ′ for γ exists. If this is the case, γ ′ gives us theoretically-
proofed probabilistic bounds on the error we commit in reconstructing the function γ (by means of γ ′).
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Based on these theoretical constructs and concepts, we now focus the attention on re-constructing the answer z to a
given range query Q = [〈l1:u1〉; 〈l2:u2〉] over A from the approximating matrix A′ (or, equally, retrieving the approximate
answer to Q , z′) and the probabilities pi (3) and p j (2) exploited by the CUR decomposition method to obtain A′ from A.
For this theoretical setting, the re-constructing function γ ′ we adopt, still inspired by [4], is deﬁned as follows:
γ ′
(
Q = [〈l1:u1〉; 〈l2:u2〉])= u1∑
i=l1
u1∑
j=l2
[
A′[i][ j] − (1− pi) · p j
pi · (1− p j) · b
]
(20)
such that: (i) A′[i][ j] denotes an element of A′; (ii) pi (3) denotes the probability of picking the i-th row of A during the CUR
decomposition method; (iii) p j (2) denotes the probability of picking the j-th column of A during the CUR decomposition
method; (iv) b is deﬁned as follows:
b = max{A
′} −min{A′}
max{A} −min{A} (21)
such that max{B} denotes the operator max over the elements of B, with B in {A,A′}, and min{B} denotes the operator
min over the elements of B, with B in {A,A′}, respectively. Theorem 2 states that the re-constructing function γ ′ (20) is an
unbiased estimator for the function γ determined by the CUR decomposition method, under the following condition:
n 4 · log
(
2
δ
)
· (pi · p j · ε)−2 (22)
such that: (i) n denotes the number of elements of A involved in the evaluation of Q ; (ii) ε and δ are positive integers
arbitrarily small; (iii) pi and p j are the probabilities (3) and (2), respectively, exploited by the CUR decomposition method.
Theorem 2. Let the value A[i][ j] in [min{A′},max{A′}] be estimated by the re-constructing function γ ′; then γ ′ is a 〈n, ε, δ〉-
unbiased-estimator for γ if the following condition holds:
n 4 · log
(
2
δ
)
· (pi · p j · ε)−2
Proof. Let Xi j denote a random variable [64] for the event that element A[i][ j] of A is perturbed, and the perturbed element
A′[i][ j] is contained by the interval [min{A′},max{A′}]. It should be noted that the collection of random variables Xi j are
i.i.d. [64], and that the probability that element A[i][ j] of A is perturbed is given by the following formula:
P(Xi j = 1) = (1− pi) · (1− p j) · b (23)
As a consequence, the following formula holds:
P(Xi j = 0) = 1− P(Xi j = 1) = 1− (1− pi) · (1− p j) · b (24)
Likewise, let Yi j denote a random variable for the event that element A[i][ j] of A is not perturbed, and it is contained by
the interval [min{A′},max{A′}]. Similarly to the case of random variables Yi j , it should be clear enough that the collection of
random variables Yi j are i.i.d. and that the probability that element A[i][ j] of A is not perturbed is given by the following
formula:
P(Yi j = 1) = pi · p j (25)
In turn, the following formula holds:
P(Yi j = 0) = 1− P(Yi j = 1) = 1− pi · p j (26)
Now, let Zi j denote a random variable for the event that, during the CUR decomposition method, element A[i][ j] of A
falls within the interval [min{A′},max{A′}]. It follows that Zi j can be deﬁned in terms of the previous random variables Xi j
and Yi j , as follows:
Zi j = Xi j + Yi j (27)
due to the fact that, during the CUR decomposition method, an arbitrary element A[i][ j] of A may be contained (i.e., Xi j = 1
and Yi j = 0) or not (i.e., Xi j = 0 and Yi j = 1) by the interval [min{A′},max{A′}]. From (27), it follows that the collection of
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is given by the following formula:
P(Zi j = 1) = P
(
(Xi j + Yi j) = 1
)= P(Xi j = 1) + P(Yi j = 1) (28)
From (23) and (25), (28) is ﬁnally given by the following formula:
P(Zi j = 1) = (1− pi) · (1− p j) · b + pi · p j (29)
As a consequence, the following formula holds:
P(Zi j = 0) = 1− P(Zi j = 1) = 1− (1− pi) · (1− p j) · b + pi · p j (30)
Furthermore, let 
1 denote the range of Q on the dimension d1 of A (A′ , respectively). From (16), it clearly follows that
the cardinality of 
1, ‖
1‖, is given by the following formula:
‖
1‖ = u1 − l1 (31)
Similarly, let 
2 denote the range of Q on the dimension d2 of A (A′ , respectively). From (16), it clearly follows again
that the cardinality of 
2, ‖
2‖, is given by the following formula:
‖
2‖ = u2 − l2 (32)
Also, let ‖Q ‖ denote the volume (or selectivity [18]) of Q . Based on (16), (31) and (32), ‖Q ‖ is given by the following
formula:
‖Q ‖ = ‖
1‖ · ‖
2‖ (33)
such that ‖
1‖ denotes the cardinality of 
1, and ‖
2‖ denotes the cardinality of 
2, respectively.
Now, let Ui j denote a random variable deﬁned as the summation of random variables Zi j [64] over the two-dimensional
domain of A (A′ , respectively) modeling the range of Q , i.e. [〈l1:u1〉; 〈l2:u2〉] that is deﬁned as follows:
Ui j(
1,
2) =
i+
1−1∑
h=i
j+
2−1∑
k= j
Zhk · A′[h][k] (34)
It should be noted that random variables Ui j are those associated to the evaluation of the approximate answer to Q , z′ ,
and that they underlie the deﬁnition of the re-constructing function γ ′ (20). The number of elements of A′ involved in the
Q ’s evaluation process, n (or, equally, the number of items of γ ′ − γ , respectively), is given by the following formula:
n = ‖Q ‖ = ‖
1‖ · ‖
2‖ (35)
How tomodel the approximate evaluation of Q over A′ in a probabilistic manner? In order to answer this critical question, ﬁrst
note that each one among the n elements A′[i][ j] of A′ may contribute (i.e., Ui j = 1) or not (i.e., Ui j = 0) to the approximate
answer to Q , z′ . Our ﬁnal aim is to ﬁnd probabilistic bounds for the probability P(Ui j = 1). Since random variables Zi j are
i.i.d. and random variables Ui j are deﬁned as the summation of Zi j , then Ui j are independent Bernoulli random variables [64].
Under the condition (22), by applying the well-known Chernoff bound [64], the following inequality holds:
P
[∣∣Ui j(
1,
2) − n · t · AVG(
1,
2)∣∣> n · θ]< 2e −n·θ24·t  δ (36)
such that (i) t = P(Zi j = 1) (29); (ii) AVG(
1,
2) denotes the average value of elements A′[i][ j] of A′ contained by the
two-dimensional range of Q , [〈l1:u1〉; 〈l2:u2〉]; (iii) θ is deﬁned as follows:
θ =
u1∏
i=l1
u2∏
j=l2
pi · p j · ε (37)
where pi and p j are the probabilities (3) and (2), respectively, exploited by the CUR decomposition method, and ε is a
positive integer arbitrarily small; (iv) δ is a positive integer arbitrarily small. From (36), it follows that, with probability
greater than 1− δ, the following inequality holds:
γ − ε <
u1∑
i=l1
u1∑
j=l2
[
A′[i][ j] − (1− pi) · p j
pi · (1− p j) · b
]
< γ + ε (38)
from which it follows that |γ − γ ′| < ε with probability 1 − δ, and that re-constructing function γ ′ (20) is an unbiased
estimator for the function γ determined by the CUR decomposition method. 
Finally, for the sake of completeness, from (17) and (20) the approximate answer to Q , z′ , can be obtained as follows:
z′ = (xT · A · y)− (xT · C · y) (39)
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Participant: External Application App
Body:
for i = 0..n− 1 do{
Q i ← editMDXQuery(Ni, Xi );
}
for i = 0..n− 1 do{
sendMessage(“START_SDO”, Ni );
}
for i = 0..n− 1 do{
sendMDXQuery(Q i ,Ni );
}
V GLOBAL ← receiveView(V GLOBAL,N0);
for i = 1..n − 1 do{
sendView(V GLOBAL,Ni);
}
for i = 0..n− 1 do{
sendMessage(“STOP_SDO”, Ni);
}
Fig. 7. Procedure SDOAppRun.
Procedure: SDONode0Run
Participant: Node N0
Body:
waitMessage(“START_SDO”, App);
Q 0 ← receiveMDXQuery(Q 0,App);
V0 ← extractLocalView(X0, Q 0);
V PP0 ← CUR(V0, r, c,k∗);
sendView(V0,N1);
V PPn−1 ← receiveView(V PPn−1, Nn−1);
V GLOBAL ← reconstructGlobalView(V PPn−1, V0, V PP0 );
sendView(V GLOBAL,App);
waitMessage(“STOP_SDO”, App);
Fig. 8. Procedure SDONode0Run.
such that C is m × n matrix whose C[i][ j] elements are deﬁned as follows:
C[i][ j] = (1− pi) · p j
pi · (1− p j) · b (40)
where pi and p j are the probabilities (3) and (2), respectively, exploited by the CUR decomposition method, and b is the
quantity (21).
6. A reliable secure distributed OLAP aggregation protocol
In our framework, the secure distributed OLAP aggregation task is implemented by the proposed protocol SDO. According
to the guidelines given in Sections 1 and 2, in our reference application scenario participants that execute SDO, referred
to as SDO participants, are the following: (i) the external application App wishing to perform OLAP over the distributed
collections of XML documents, Xi denoting the collection of XML documents stored at the node Ni ; (ii) the n nodes Ni , with
0 i  n − 1, populating the distributed environment that participate to the target distributed OLAP setting. In particular,
with respect to the second class of SDO participants, we distinguish between the node N0, which is the ﬁrst one in the
ﬁxed node ordering, and nodes Ni , with 1  i  n − 1.
According to the models and paradigms given in Sections 1 and 2, in SDO the following procedures are deﬁned: (i) pro-
cedure SDOAppRun (see Fig. 7), which is implemented by the SDO participant external application App; (ii) procedure
SDONode0Run (see Fig. 8), which is implemented by the SDO participant node N0; (iii) procedure SDONodeIRun (see Fig. 9),
which is implemented by the SDO participant node Ni , with 1  i  n − 1.
The meaning of the sub-procedures exploited by the main procedures of SDO (i.e., SDOAppRun, SDONode0Run, and
SDONodeIRun) is self-explicative. One item of interest is the method used to reconstruct the exact (see Section 1) global
OLAP view V GLOBAL from the views V PPn−1, V0, and V PP0 (sub-procedure reconstructGlobalView of SDONode0Run). From Sec-
tion 2, recall that in our research we speciﬁcally focus the attention on the class of SUM-based distributed OLAP aggregation
tasks, while still being our proposed framework general enough to deal with more sophisticated OLAP aggregations. Thanks
to the fact that SUM-based OLAP aggregation is a non-holistic operator [42], it is easy to demonstrate that V GLOBAL can be
reconstructed as follows, as formally stated by Theorem 3:
V GLOBAL = V0 +
(
V PPn−1 − V PP0
)
(41)
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Participant: Node Ni , 1 i n − 1
Body:
waitMessage(“START_SDO”, App);
Q i ← receiveMDXQuery(Q i,App);
Vi ← extractLocalView(Xi, Q i);
V PPi−1 ← receiveView(V PPi−1,Ni−1);
V PPi ← aggregateViews(Vi , V PPi−1);
sendView(V PPi ,N(i+1) MOD n);
V GLOBAL ← receiveView(V GLOBAL,App);
waitMessage(“STOP_SDO”, App);
Fig. 9. Procedure SDONodeIRun.
Theorem 3. The ﬁnal global OLAP view V GLOBAL obtained from any arbitrary SUM-based secure OLAP aggregation task over a dis-
tributed environment populated by n nodes can be retrieved from combining the local OLAP view V0 at node N0 , the privacy preserving
OLAP view V PP0 at node N0 and the privacy preserving OLAP view V
PP
n−1 at node Nn−1 without dependence on the OLAP views located
at other nodes Ni , with 1 i  n − 2, of the reference distributed environment, i.e. V GLOBAL = V0 + (V PPn−1 − V PP0 ).
Proof. Take as reference a distributed environment populated by n nodes. First, note that, given two consecutive nodes Ni−1
and Ni in the ﬁxed node ordering, such that 1  i  n − 2, since we focus on SUM-based OLAP aggregations, the privacy
preserving view V PPi at node Ni is obtained by combining the local view Vi at node Ni with the privacy preserving view
V PPi−1 returned to the node Ni from the node Ni−1, as follows (see Section 1):
V PPi = Vi + V PPi−1 (42)
Contrary to this, for the sole instance represented by the ﬁrst node N0, the privacy preserving view V PP0 is directly
obtained from the local view V0 (see Section 1) via the CUR-based approximation method (see Section 5). Hence, with
respect to privacy preserving views located at nodes of the reference distributed environment, the following equalities hold:
V PP0 = CUR(V0)
V PP1 = V1 + V PP0
V PP2 = V2 + V PP1
· · ·
V PPn−1 = Vn−1 + V PPn−2 (43)
Based on (42), by applying simple mathematical substitutions, (43) can be re-written as follows:
V PP0 = CUR(V0)
V PP1 = V1 + V PP0
V PP2 = V2 + V PP1 = V2 + V1 + V PP0
· · ·
V PPn−1 = Vn−1 + Vn−2 + · · · + V1 + V PP0 (44)
Based on (44), (41) can be expanded as follows:
V GLOBAL = V0 +
(
V PPn−1 − V PP0
)= V0 + ((Vn−1 + Vn−2 + · · · + V1 + V PP0 )− V PP0 ) (45)
i.e.:
V GLOBAL = V0 + V1 + V2 + · · · + Vn−1 (46)
which, from Section 1, represents the (exact) ﬁnal result of the target distributed OLAP aggregation task. 
Theorem 3 is another relevant theoretical result of our research. It allows us to obtain the ﬁnal global result of the
target secure distributed OLAP aggregation task, V GLOBAL from the OLAP views stored at the ﬁrst node N0 of the reference
distributed environment, V0 and V PP0 , respectively, one exact (i.e., V0) and one privacy preserving (i.e., V
PP
0 ), and from the
privacy preserving OLAP view V PPn−1 returned to the node N0 from the node Nn−1, without dependence on the OLAP views (local
and privacy preserving) of the other nodes Ni , with 1  i  n−2, of the reference distributed environment. Intuitively enough,
this phenomenon opens to interesting theoretical as well as query-optimization opportunities to be embedded within the
proposed privacy preserving distributed OLAP framework.
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speciﬁc method used to obtain the privacy preserving view V PPi at node Ni (CUR, in our case), hence it maintains its validity
and generality with any arbitrary privacy preserving method from the state-of-the-art literature (e.g., [22,35,48,73,84,85,94,
23,58,5]). This gives further merits to our research.
Corollary 1. The proposed privacy preserving distributed OLAP framework is orthogonal to the method used to compute privacy pre-
serving two-dimensional OLAP views.
6.1. Differential privacy notions for privacy preserving distributed OLAP
Let us now focus on other theoretical properties of our privacy preserving distributed OLAP framework that are related to
the well-understood context of differential privacy [32]. Based on the non-holistic nature of SUM-based OLAP aggregations,
given a local view Vi at node Ni , we introduce two different notations of differential privacy for the privacy preserving
process over Vi (i.e., V PPi = Vi + V PPi−1). The ﬁrst one, formally introduced by Deﬁnition 2, is named as full-differential privacy,
denoted by 
P Fi , and it is modeled as that (two-dimensional) view that makes V
PP
i and Vi different (or, equally, that makes
V PPi privacy preserving). 
P
F
i is deﬁned as follows:

P Fi = V PPi − Vi (47)
The second differential privacy notion, formally introduced by Deﬁnition 3, is named as marginal-differential privacy,
denoted by 
PMi , and it is modeled as that (two-dimensional) cell partitions of V
PP
i that are different by the corresponding
cell partition of Vi . Elements of 
PMi are deﬁned as follows:

PMi [m][c] =
{
Vi[m][c] if V PPi [m][c] = Vi[m][c], 0m ‖di,0‖ ∧ 0 c  ‖di,1‖
V PPi [m][c] otherwise
(48)
such that di,0 and di,1 denote the dimensions of Vi , respectively. Note that ‖di,0‖ = ‖dPPi,0‖ and ‖di,1‖ = ‖dPPi,1‖, such that dPPi,0
and dPPi,1 denote the dimensions of V
PP
i , respectively.
It should be noted that, while full-differential privacy 
P Fi (47) is conform with classical interpretations of differential
privacy [32], marginal-differential privacy 
PMi (48) plays a relevant role with respect to the critical aspect represented by
performance issues of Privacy Preserving DataMining [2], e.g. maintaining a privacy preserving data model under the occurrence
of updates on the target data sources.
Deﬁnition 2. Given a two-dimensional OLAP view V and its privacy preserving version V PP, the full-differential privacy between V PP
and V , denoted by 
P F , is a two-dimensional view deﬁned as follows: 
P F = V PP − V .
Deﬁnition 3. Given a two-dimensional OLAP view V and its privacy preserving version V PP, the marginal-differential privacy between
V PP and V , denoted by 
PM , is a partition of two-dimensional cells whose elements are deﬁned as follows:

PM [m][c] =
{
V [m][c] if V PP[m][c] = V [m][c], 0m ‖d0‖ ∧ 0 c  ‖d1‖
V PP[m][c] otherwise
such that d0 and d1 denote the dimensions of V , respectively.
Starting from the basic differential privacy notions, their global versions are derived in our framework as follows, respec-
tively. First, from Section 1, the following two critical aspects of our privacy preserving distributed OLAP framework should
be clear enough: (i) the full-differential privacy 
P Fi that propagates across pair of consecutive nodes Ni−1 and Ni (in
the ﬁxed node ordering) of the reference distributed environment is originated by the “ﬁrst” full-differential privacy 
P F0
at node N0; (ii) 
P F0 represents the differential privacy that, by propagating node by node, makes each local view V i at
node Ni , with 1  i  n−1, privacy preserving (i.e., V PPi ), in consequence of the secure OLAP aggregation routine performed
at node Ni under the vest of a baseline step of the whole secure distributed OLAP aggregation task. Hence, at the last node
Nn−1 of the reference distributed environment, the full-differential privacy 
P Fn−1 at node Nn−1 globally embeds all the contribu-
tions of the “previous” full-differential privacies 
P F0 , 
P
F
1 , . . . ,
P
F
n−2. This gives raise to the concept of global full-differential
privacy, formally introduced by Deﬁnition 4, that is associated to the target secure distributed OLAP aggregation task T ,
denoted by 
P FT , which is deﬁned as follows:

P FT =
n−1∑
i=0

P Fi = 
P F0 + 
P F1 + · · · + 
P Fn−1 (49)
such that 
P Fi denotes the full-differential privacy at node Ni . Intuitively enough, similarly to Theorem 3, Deﬁnition 4 can
be exploited for further theoretical stuff as well as query-optimization opportunities.
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Main characteristics of the synthetic XML data sets.
File name Dimension (MB) Elements Attributes Max-depth Avg. depth
unif.xml 12 149,225 12 22 19.4
gauss.xml 21 580,124 6 9 8.8
zipf.xml 18 322,685 1 8 4.98
Table 2
Main characteristics of the benchmark XML data sets.
File name Dimension (MB) Elements Attributes Max-depth Avg. depth
xmark100.xml 111 1,666,315 381,178 11 5.52
lineitem.xml 30 1,022,976 1 3 2.94
xbench.xml 121 840,857 0 9 5.16
At the same, we derive, with similar insights, the concept of global marginal-differential privacy, formally introduced by
Deﬁnition 5, that is associated to the target secure distributed OLAP aggregation task T , denoted by 
PMT , as follows:

PMT =
n−1∑
i=0

PMi = 
PM0 + 
PM1 + · · · + 
PMn−1 (50)
such that 
PMi denotes the marginal-differential privacy at node Ni .
Deﬁnition 4. Given an arbitrary SUM-based secure OLAP aggregation task T over a distributed environment populated by n nodes,
the global full-differential privacy associated to T , denoted by 
P FT , is deﬁned as follows:

P FT =
n−1∑
i=0

P Fi = 
P F0 + 
P F1 + · · · + 
P Fn−1
such that 
P Fi denotes the full-differential privacy at node Ni .
Deﬁnition 5. Given an arbitrary SUM-based secure OLAP aggregation task T over a distributed environment populated by n nodes,
the global marginal-differential privacy associated to T , denoted by 
PMT , is deﬁned as follows:

PMT =
n−1∑
i=0

PMi = 
PM0 + 
PM1 + · · · + 
PMn−1
such that 
PMi denotes the marginal-differential privacy at node Ni .
7. Experimental evaluation and analysis
In order to assess the effectiveness and the eﬃciency of our privacy preserving distributed OLAP framework, we
conducted a comprehensive experimental campaign on distributed collections of synthetic, benchmark and real-life XML
documents stored in (synthetic, benchmark and real-life) XML data sets, against which we tested the performance of the
proposed secure distributed OLAP aggregation protocol SDO under the ranging of several experimental parameters. This
ﬁnally allowed us to achieve a wide and reliable experimental evaluation and analysis.
First, we provide a description about the XML data sets adopted in our experimental campaign. For what regards syn-
thetic XML data sets (Table 1 reports the main characteristics of these data sets), element values of the synthetic XML
documents have been generated according to three distinct data distributions, namely Uniform [18], Gauss [64], and Zipf
[95]. In more detail, Uniform data sets have been generated by means of a Uniform distribution on the interval [75,125];
Gauss data sets have been generated by means of a normal Gauss distribution; Zipf data sets have been generated by means
of a Zipf distribution whose parameter z ranges on the interval [0.5,0.9]. As regards benchmark XML data sets (Table 2
reports the main characteristics of these data sets), we considered the popular data sets XMark [71], the XML-version of
TPC-H [79] and XBench [92]. In particular, for the data set TCP-H, we considered the XML document extracted from the
table Lineitem, which is the biggest one among those composing the whole data set. Finally, as regards real-life XML data
sets (Table 3 reports the main characteristics of these data sets), we considered the well-known data sets Treebank [80],
SwissProt [75] and NASA [44]. In turn, from each one of these XML data sets, we extracted a 2,000× 2,000 two-dimensional
OLAP view, whose (two-dimensional) data cells follow the same distribution of the underlying (XML) data set.
We deﬁned four kinds of experiment. In the ﬁrst kind of experiment, we analyze the privacy preserving capabilities
of the CUR decomposition method on a singleton two-dimensional OLAP view with respect to the ranging of the number
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Main characteristics of the real-life XML data sets.
File name Dimension (MB) Elements Attributes Max-depth Avg. depth
treebank_e.xml 82 2,437,666 1 36 7.87
swissprot.xml 109 2,977,031 2,189,859 5 3.56
nasa.xml 23 476,646 56,317 8 5.58
Fig. 10. Variation of F P w.r.t. the number of columns c (number of blocks, respectively) on 2,000 × 2,000 OLAP views extracted from synthetic (a),
benchmark (b) and real-life (c) XML data sets for the CUR decomposition method and Zero-Sum.
of columns c exploited by the method itself to compute privacy preserving OLAP views (see Section 5). In the second
kind of experiment, we conducted a similar experience but focused to study the CUR-decomposition’s privacy preserving
capabilities with respect to the ranging of the probability p j (2) of picking the j-th column of the target OLAP view during
the decomposition process (see Section 5). In the third kind of experiment, we analyze the privacy preserving capabilities
of our distributed OLAP framework, by studying how the “privacy degree” of distributed OLAP views, stored at nodes of
the target experimental setting, varies across the nodes under the execution of a SUM-based distributed OLAP aggregation
task (see Sections 1 and 2). In all the ﬁrst three kinds of experiment, we considered Zero-Sum [73] as the comparison
method. This because of three main reasons: (i) Zero-Sum makes use of a matrix-like formalism to face-off and solve the
privacy preserving of OLAP data cubes, like ours; (ii) Zero-Sum can be reasonably considered as one of the state-of-the-art
perturbation-based approach for centralized privacy preserving OLAP, as highlighted in Section 3; (iii) due to its simplicity,
Zero-Sum can be easily extended as to deal with the more probing case of distributed privacy preserving OLAP, like the
one addressed and solved by our proposed framework (in this extended implementation, the “original” method Zero-Sum
plays the same role of the one played by the CUR decomposition method in our framework, i.e. dealing with the privacy
preservation of a singleton two-dimensional OLAP view). Finally, in the fourth kind of experiment, we stressed the sensitivity
of the CUR decomposition method by studying the variation of the probability P(eE) (14) of the event of eE = A≡ A′ , which
models the case of obtaining the approximate matrix A′ as equal to the input matrix A (see Section 5), with respect to the
ranging of the probability p j (2) (like in the second kind of experiment).
As regards the metrics of evaluating our privacy preserving distributed OLAP framework, we considered the privacy factor
F P introduced by Sung et al. in [73], which gives a reliable measure of how much a privacy preserving OLAP data cube
(OLAP view, respectively) D′ preserves the privacy of the original OLAP data cube (OLAP view, respectively) D by inspecting
the privacy of cells of D′ with respect to cells of D. In more detail, let (i) D be the input data cube, (ii) D′ be the privacy
preserving data cube computed by means of a given (privacy preserving) method, (iii) X{k} be a data cube cell having k as
multidimensional index, with X in {D,D′}, the privacy factor F P is deﬁned as follows [73]:
F P
(D,D′)= 1‖D‖ ·
‖D‖−1∑
k=0
|D′{k} − D{k}|
|D{k}| (51)
Fig. 10 shows the results obtained from the ﬁrst kind of experiment, i.e. the percentage variation of the privacy factor F P
with respect to the number of columns c on 2,000 × 2,000 two-dimensional OLAP views extracted from the synthetic (a),
benchmark (b) and real-life (c) XML data sets. With respect to the comparison approach Zero-Sum, the parameter c models
the number of blocks of the partition used to compute the ﬁnal privacy preserving OLAP view [73]. As shown by Fig. 10,
privacy factor values ensured by the CUR decomposition method are high so that obtained (perturbed) OLAP views are
privacy preserving accordingly. Also, it turns that the CUR decomposition method outperforms Zero-Sum. Note that, with
respect to the synthetic XML data sets, the CUR decomposition method works well on Uniform data sets rather than on
Gauss and Zipf data sets (for which the performance is still high), because of the sampling phase introduced by the method
(as widely-known, sampling works well on Uniform data sets [26] rather than other kinds of data sets).
Fig. 11 shows the results obtained from the second kind of experiment, i.e. the percentage variation of the privacy factor
F P with respect to the probability p j (2) on the target OLAP views considered in our experimental assessment. With respect
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for the CUR decomposition method and Zero-Sum.
Fig. 12. Variation of F P w.r.t. the node position i of a 20-node distributed environment on 2,000× 2,000 OLAP views extracted from synthetic (a), bench-
mark (b) and real-life (c) XML data sets for the CUR decomposition method and Zero-Sum.
to the comparison approach Zero-Sum, the parameter p j models the probability of perturbing data cube cells belonging to the
j-th block of the partition used to compute the ﬁnal privacy preserving OLAP view [73]. Like for the case of the ﬁrst kind of
experiment, as conﬁrmed by Fig. 11, we again observed a good performance of the CUR decomposition method.
Fig. 12 shows the results obtained from the third kind of experiment, i.e. the percentage variation of the privacy factor
F P with respect to the position i of nodes populating a target experimental distributed environment composed by 20
nodes, such that each node stores one singleton OLAP view among those considered in our experimental assessment. In
more detail, in this experiment we inspected the “privacy degree” of each new local OLAP view generated in each node
by a singleton aggregation step of the whole distributed OLAP aggregation task. As shown by Fig. 12, the privacy factor
F P increases with the node position, i.e. each new local OLAP view achieves a higher privacy degree than the degree of
previous views (in the ﬁxed node ordering). The latter is a nice property conﬁrming that our proposed privacy preserving
distributed OLAP framework fully satisﬁes the rigorous requirements and constraints posed by the SMC model. Also, Fig. 12
demonstrates that the proposed privacy framework, beyond ensuring a good privacy preservation effect on singleton two-
dimensional OLAP views as conﬁrmed by the previous two kinds of experiment, exposes a good performance even over
the target experimental distributed environment, hence it perfectly fulﬁlls the initial goals (i.e., effectively and eﬃciently
supporting secure distributed OLAP aggregation tasks — see Sections 1 and 2), yet outperforming the comparison approach
Zero-Sum in a distributed setting as well as in a centralized one.
Finally, Fig. 13 shows the results obtained from the fourth kind of experiment, i.e. the variation of the probability P(eE)
(14) with respect to the ranging of the probability p j (2), both being critical model parameters of the CUR decomposition
method, again on the target OLAP views considered in our experimental assessment. As shown in Fig. 13, we observe an
initial increase of P(eE) as p j increases (as expected), but then P(eE) makes stable to around under the value 0.5. This
further conﬁrms to us the beneﬁts of the CUR decomposition method in computing effective privacy preserving OLAP views.
Concluding, our comprehensive experimental campaign conducted on distributed collections of synthetic, benchmark
and real-life XML data sets, has clearly demonstrated, under the stressing of a wide variety of experimental parameters, the
effectiveness and the eﬃciency of the proposed privacy preserving distributed OLAP framework, even in comparison with
the performance of the state-of-the-art perturbation-based method Zero-Sum.
8. Conclusions and future work
Inspired by research challenges arising in next-generation distributed BI environments relying on (distributed) collections
of XML documents, in this paper we have proposed a novel secure distributed OLAP aggregation task, along with the
proposal of an effective and eﬃcient SMC-based privacy preserving distributed OLAP framework able of implementing this
A. Cuzzocrea, E. Bertino / Journal of Computer and System Sciences 77 (2011) 965–987 985Fig. 13. Variation of P(eE ) w.r.t. the probability p j on 2,000× 2,000 OLAP views extracted from synthetic (a), benchmark (b) and real-life (c) XML data sets
for the CUR decomposition method.
novel task via the protocol SDO in a trustworthy and reliable manner. We have provided several theoretical properties
of the proposed framework, which make it theoretically-sound and solid. The second contribution of this research is the
experimental assessment of the proposed framework against distributed collections of synthetic, benchmark and real-life
XML documents. The assessment has validated the beneﬁts due to our privacy preserving distributed OLAP framework, even
in comparison with the performance of the state-of-the-art perturbation-based method Zero-Sum. Future work will focus
on the following three main problems: (i) assuring the robustness of the framework with respect to coalitions of attackers;
(ii) eﬃciently supporting updates on the distributed collections of XML documents that aliment the OLAP views on top of
which distributed OLAP aggregation tasks are performed; (iii) integrating the proposed framework within the core layer
of next-generation Data Warehousing and Data Mining server systems, and building useful real-life case studies in emerging
application scenarios (e.g., analytics over complex data [10,13]).
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